Formation and Analysis of Optimal Interbank Networks under Liquidity Shocks: A Decentralized vs. Centralized Approach

Khái niệm cốt lõi

Decentralized interbank networks, while individually optimal for banks, lead to lower overall liquidity and higher systemic risk compared to a centralized network managed by a social planner aiming to maximize total welfare.

Tóm tắt

Bibliographic Information:

Rigobon, D. E., & Sircar, R. (2024). Formation of Optimal Interbank Networks under Liquidity Shocks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.12404v2.

Research Objective:

This research paper investigates the formation of optimal interbank networks under liquidity shocks, comparing decentralized networks driven by individual bank optimization to centralized networks managed by a social planner. The study aims to understand the differences in liquidity levels, systemic risk, and overall welfare between these two network structures.

Methodology:

The authors develop a continuous-time model of a financial system where banks allocate capital between cash reserves and investments in other banks' projects. These projects are subject to liquidity shocks, the likelihood of which is influenced by the bank's cash reserves. The researchers derive and analyze the optimal capital allocations for both decentralized and centralized settings using stochastic optimal control techniques.

Key Findings:

• Both decentralized and centralized networks exhibit a core-periphery structure, where only a subset of banks attract external investments.
• Banks in the decentralized setting hold less cash reserves compared to the centralized setting, making them more susceptible to liquidity shortages.
• Despite this, the relative welfare gap between the two settings remains constant as the system size grows.
• The social planner's optimal allocation can be replicated in a decentralized setting by imposing co-investment requirements, primarily on banks in the network's core.

Main Conclusions:

The study highlights the inherent inefficiency of decentralized financial networks in managing liquidity risk. While individual banks optimize for their own benefit, they fail to internalize the negative externalities imposed on the system, leading to lower overall liquidity and higher systemic risk. The research suggests that regulatory interventions, such as co-investment requirements targeted at core banks, can help align decentralized outcomes with the socially optimal allocation.

Significance:

This research provides valuable insights into the dynamics of interbank networks and the role of liquidity in systemic risk. The findings have significant implications for regulatory policy, particularly in the wake of recent banking crises, by emphasizing the importance of adequate liquidity reserves and targeted interventions to mitigate systemic vulnerabilities.

Limitations and Future Research:

The model assumes perfect information and does not explicitly account for contagion effects. Future research could explore the impact of imperfect information and interbank contagion on the formation and stability of financial networks. Additionally, incorporating more realistic features like interbank lending and borrowing could provide a more nuanced understanding of optimal network structures.

Thống kê

Trích dẫn

"In this paper, we construct a continuous-time model of a financial system in which banks are exposed to both their own and possibly each others’ liquidity shocks."
"A key focus of this paper is that each bank endogenously chooses to allocate its capital between cash reserves (i.e. supply of liquidity) and other banks’ risky projects."
"This occurs because our model captures a simple negative externality: when individualistically determining how much cash to hold in reserves, a bank sets the level of risk experienced by external investors in its project."

Thông tin chi tiết chính được chắt lọc từ

Formation of Optimal Interbank Networks under Liquidity Shocks

by Daniel E. Ri... lúc arxiv.org 10-08-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.12404.pdf

Yêu cầu sâu hơn

How would the introduction of interbank lending and borrowing mechanisms affect the optimal network structure and the relative efficiency of decentralized versus centralized settings?

Introducing interbank lending and borrowing mechanisms would significantly enrich the model and potentially alter the optimal network structure and relative efficiency in several ways:
Impact on Optimal Network Structure:

Increased Interconnectivity: Interbank lending would likely lead to a more interconnected network compared to the core-periphery structure observed in the current model. Banks facing liquidity shortages could borrow from those with surpluses, potentially mitigating the need for large cash reserves.
Emergence of New Structures: Depending on the lending mechanisms (e.g., interest rate setting, collateral requirements), different network structures could emerge. We might see:

Centralized Lending Networks: A few core banks might become dominant lenders, acting as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders.
Clustered Networks: Banks with similar risk profiles or geographic proximity might form lending clusters.

Dynamic Network Structure: The network structure could become more dynamic, changing in response to evolving liquidity needs and risk perceptions.
Impact on Relative Efficiency:

Reduced Inefficiency in Decentralized Setting: Interbank lending could improve the efficiency of the decentralized setting by allowing for a more efficient allocation of liquidity within the system. Banks could hold lower cash reserves, reducing the opportunity cost of holding liquidity.
Ambiguous Impact on Centralized Setting: The impact on the centralized setting is less clear-cut. While lending could further enhance liquidity allocation, the planner might need to manage potential moral hazard problems (e.g., excessive risk-taking by borrowers).
New Trade-offs for the Planner: The planner would face new trade-offs in balancing the benefits of efficient liquidity allocation against the risks of contagion and systemic instability.
Overall:
Introducing interbank lending would add a layer of complexity and realism to the model. It has the potential to improve the efficiency of the decentralized setting by mitigating the negative externality of individual banks' decisions on liquidity risk. However, it also introduces new challenges for the planner in managing systemic risk.

Could the core-periphery structure observed in both decentralized and centralized settings be inherently unstable, potentially amplifying the impact of shocks on core banks and the entire system?

Yes, the core-periphery structure, while seemingly robust under normal conditions, could exhibit inherent instabilities that amplify shocks, particularly those affecting core banks:
Amplified Impact of Shocks on Core Banks:

Concentrated Exposures: Peripheral banks are heavily invested in core banks' projects due to their higher expected returns. A shock to a core bank would lead to significant losses for peripheral banks, potentially triggering a cascade of failures.
Interconnectedness of Core Banks: Core banks themselves might have significant exposures to each other, further amplifying the impact of shocks within the core.
Systemic Implications:

Contagion Risk: The failure of a core bank could trigger a domino effect, spreading through the network and impacting even those banks not directly exposed to the initial shock.
Loss of Confidence: A shock to a core bank could erode confidence in the entire system, leading to a freeze in interbank lending and a system-wide liquidity crisis.
Mitigating Factors:

Cash Reserves of Core Banks: The model assumes core banks hold larger cash reserves, providing a buffer against smaller shocks.
Diversification within the Periphery: If peripheral banks diversify their investments across multiple core banks, the impact of a single core bank failure could be mitigated.
Policy Implications:

Importance of Core Bank Supervision: Regulators should focus on rigorous supervision of core banks, ensuring they maintain adequate capital buffers and manage their interbank exposures.
Promoting Network Resilience: Policies that encourage diversification of interbank exposures and strengthen the resilience of the entire network are crucial.
Overall:
The core-periphery structure, while efficient in allocating capital under normal conditions, can become a source of instability during periods of stress. Understanding and mitigating these vulnerabilities is crucial for ensuring the stability of the financial system.

How can insights from this research be applied to other types of networks beyond finance, such as social networks or supply chains, where individual optimization might lead to suboptimal collective outcomes?

The insights from this research on financial networks and the potential inefficiencies arising from individual optimization can be extended to various other network structures:
Social Networks:

Spread of Information and Misinformation: Individuals in social networks often share information based on their own biases and preferences, leading to echo chambers and the rapid spread of misinformation. A centralized approach to information dissemination, potentially through algorithms that prioritize accuracy and diversity of viewpoints, could mitigate these issues.
Formation of Social Groups: People tend to form social connections based on shared interests and backgrounds, leading to segregated networks. This can exacerbate social inequalities and hinder the flow of diverse perspectives. Interventions that encourage cross-group interactions and promote inclusivity could be beneficial.
Supply Chains:

Inventory Management: Individual firms in a supply chain often optimize their inventory levels based on their own cost structures and demand forecasts. This can lead to the bullwhip effect, where small fluctuations in consumer demand are amplified upstream, resulting in inefficiencies and disruptions. Collaborative forecasting and inventory management practices across the supply chain can mitigate this problem.
Resilience to Disruptions: Individual firms might prioritize cost optimization over resilience, leading to fragile supply chains vulnerable to disruptions (e.g., natural disasters, geopolitical events). A system-level perspective that incentivizes redundancy and diversification can enhance overall resilience.
General Principles:

Identifying Negative Externalities: The first step is to identify situations where individual optimization creates negative externalities, leading to suboptimal collective outcomes.
Centralized Coordination vs. Decentralized Incentives: Explore whether centralized coordination mechanisms (e.g., regulations, standards, information sharing platforms) or redesigned incentives for individual agents can better align individual and collective interests.
Network Structure and Resilience: Analyze how the network structure itself contributes to vulnerabilities and explore ways to promote resilience through diversification, redundancy, or alternative network designs.
Overall:
The core message is that individual optimization within a network, while rational from an individual perspective, can lead to unintended negative consequences for the collective. Understanding these dynamics and exploring mechanisms to align individual and collective interests is crucial for promoting efficiency, stability, and resilience in various network structures.