The content discusses the challenge of maximizing consumer surplus in auction settings, focusing on aligning buyer utility with seller objectives. It introduces the VCG mechanism with copies and analyzes its performance under different valuation scenarios. The study provides insights into optimal mechanisms for various auction settings to achieve consumer surplus efficiently.
The authors address open questions posed by previous research and extend their findings to multi-parameter auction settings. They propose innovative approaches to balance prices effectively while maximizing social welfare and ensuring truthful reporting of private information. The work contributes significantly to mechanism design theory, offering practical solutions for optimizing consumer surplus in auctions.
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by Tomer Ezra,D... lúc arxiv.org 02-29-2024
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2402.16972.pdfYêu cầu sâu hơn