thông tin chi tiết - Mechanism Design - # Revenue-Maximizing Auctions

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions: A Study of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions

Q: How does the Error-Tolerant auction improve revenue guarantees based on prediction quality

The Error-Tolerant auction improves revenue guarantees based on prediction quality by introducing an error-tolerance parameter, denoted as γ. This parameter allows the auction to adjust the threshold for winning the item based on the prediction quality. When the prediction quality q is at least as high as the error-tolerance γ, the auction achieves a revenue guarantee that is a function of α, γ, and q. Specifically, the auction guarantees a competitive ratio of αγq against the first-best revenue benchmark v(1) and a competitive ratio of 1−α2/4 against the second-best revenue benchmark v(2). This means that the auction can extract more revenue when the prediction quality is high, providing stronger guarantees when the prediction is accurate.

Q: What are the key differences between the challenges in proving impossibility results for revenue maximization compared to social welfare maximization

The key differences between proving impossibility results for revenue maximization compared to social welfare maximization lie in the additional challenges posed by revenue maximization. First, in revenue maximization, the mechanism's decisions depend not only on who wins the good but also on the price that the winner pays. This introduces complexity as the mechanism must balance revenue extraction with pricing decisions. Second, strategyproofness is crucial in revenue maximization, as mechanisms need to ensure that bidders cannot manipulate their reports to gain an advantage. This constraint adds another layer of complexity to proving impossibility results in revenue maximization. In contrast, social welfare maximization does not necessarily require strategyproofness, making the analysis less intricate.

Q: How can the insights from this study be applied to other dynamic auction settings beyond revenue maximization

The insights from this study can be applied to other dynamic auction settings beyond revenue maximization by considering the trade-off between consistency and robustness in mechanism design. By incorporating machine-learned predictions into online auctions, designers can enhance the performance of auctions in dynamic environments where bidders arrive and depart over time. The approach of balancing accuracy in predictions with worst-case guarantees can be extended to various auction scenarios, such as multi-item auctions, auctions with budget constraints, or auctions with complex bidder preferences. By optimizing the trade-off between prediction quality, consistency, and robustness, auction designers can improve revenue outcomes and bidder satisfaction in diverse auction settings.

Khái niệm cốt lõi

Online mechanism design with predictions aims to optimize revenue through a strategyproof mechanism.

Tóm tắt

The content discusses the concept of online mechanism design with predictions, focusing on revenue-maximizing auctions. It introduces the Three-Phase auction, analyzing its consistency and robustness guarantees. The study extends to an Error-Tolerant auction for improved revenue guarantees based on prediction quality. Impossibility results for revenue maximization are also explored, highlighting the challenges and constraints in achieving optimal performance.

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Thống kê

Our main result is a strategyproof mechanism whose revenue guarantees are α-consistent with respect to the highest value and (1 −α2)/4-robust with respect to the second-highest value, for α ∈[0, 1].
The Three-Phase learning-augmented online auction achieves α-consistency with respect to the first-best revenue benchmark and (1 −α2)/4-robustness with respect to the second-best revenue benchmark.

Trích dẫn

"The goal is to use predictions to guarantee strong performance when accurate and maintain worst-case guarantees when inaccurate."
"The Three-Phase auction achieves a trade-off between consistency and robustness in online mechanism design."

Thông tin chi tiết chính được chắt lọc từ

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions

by Eric Balkans... lúc arxiv.org 03-28-2024

https://arxiv.org/pdf/2310.02879.pdf

Online Mechanism Design with Predictions

Yêu cầu sâu hơn

How does the Error-Tolerant auction improve revenue guarantees based on prediction quality

The Error-Tolerant auction improves revenue guarantees based on prediction quality by introducing an error-tolerance parameter, denoted as γ. This parameter allows the auction to adjust the threshold for winning the item based on the prediction quality. When the prediction quality q is at least as high as the error-tolerance γ, the auction achieves a revenue guarantee that is a function of α, γ, and q. Specifically, the auction guarantees a competitive ratio of αγq against the first-best revenue benchmark v(1) and a competitive ratio of 1−α2/4 against the second-best revenue benchmark v(2). This means that the auction can extract more revenue when the prediction quality is high, providing stronger guarantees when the prediction is accurate.

What are the key differences between the challenges in proving impossibility results for revenue maximization compared to social welfare maximization

The key differences between proving impossibility results for revenue maximization compared to social welfare maximization lie in the additional challenges posed by revenue maximization. First, in revenue maximization, the mechanism's decisions depend not only on who wins the good but also on the price that the winner pays. This introduces complexity as the mechanism must balance revenue extraction with pricing decisions. Second, strategyproofness is crucial in revenue maximization, as mechanisms need to ensure that bidders cannot manipulate their reports to gain an advantage. This constraint adds another layer of complexity to proving impossibility results in revenue maximization. In contrast, social welfare maximization does not necessarily require strategyproofness, making the analysis less intricate.

How can the insights from this study be applied to other dynamic auction settings beyond revenue maximization

The insights from this study can be applied to other dynamic auction settings beyond revenue maximization by considering the trade-off between consistency and robustness in mechanism design. By incorporating machine-learned predictions into online auctions, designers can enhance the performance of auctions in dynamic environments where bidders arrive and depart over time. The approach of balancing accuracy in predictions with worst-case guarantees can be extended to various auction scenarios, such as multi-item auctions, auctions with budget constraints, or auctions with complex bidder preferences. By optimizing the trade-off between prediction quality, consistency, and robustness, auction designers can improve revenue outcomes and bidder satisfaction in diverse auction settings.