The content discusses the cryptographic implications of having access to a single Haar random quantum state. The key insights are:
In the Common Haar Random State (CHRS) model, where all parties have access to polynomially many copies of a single Haar random state, single-copy pseudorandom states (1PRS) can be constructed. This is done by applying a quantum one-time pad to slightly less than half of the qubits of the Haar random state.
The constructed 1PRS can be used to build a statistically hiding and binding quantum bit-commitment scheme in the CHRS model.
Building on the 1PRS construction, an oracle separation is shown between 1PRS and the stronger notion of (multi-copy) pseudorandom states (PRS). Specifically, there exists a quantum oracle relative to which 1PRS exist, but PRS do not. This separation is achieved by using the "quantum OR lemma" to devise an attack on any PRS construction in the augmented CHRS model.
The work highlights that a single Haar random state, while not sufficient for constructing the stronger PRS, is surprisingly powerful in enabling the construction of the weaker 1PRS and quantum bit-commitments.
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