Endogenous Perception and Optimal Mechanism Design
The agent's perception of their private information can be endogenously determined by the incentive structure of the mechanism, rather than being a fixed characteristic. The designer must account for how the mechanism shapes the agent's cognitive state and resulting perception when choosing an optimal mechanism.
최적 광고 판매를 위한 후회 최소화 관점
공동 광고 판매 문제에서 수익을 최대화하는 인센티브 호환 메커니즘을 온라인 학습 관점에서 접근한다. 다양한 환경(확률적, 적대적, 부드러운 적대적)에서 효율적인 학습 알고리즘을 제안하고, 이에 대한 상한과 하한을 분석한다.
Designing Approximately Incentive-Compatible and Welfare-Maximizing Resource Allocation Mechanisms without Payments
The authors propose a novel neural network-based mechanism, ExS-Net, that achieves a desirable trade-off between social welfare maximization and approximate incentive compatibility in a payment-free resource allocation setting.
Fair Artificial Currency Incentives in Repeated Weighted Congestion Games: Achieving Equity and Equality
Optimierung von Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit in wiederholten gewichteten Stauungsspielen durch künstliche Währungsanreize.
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions: A Study of Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
Online mechanism design with predictions aims to optimize revenue through a strategyproof mechanism.
Analyzing Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions
The authors propose a mechanism that combines preferences and predictions for public project decision-making, ensuring robustness to manipulation.
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