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näkemys - Mechanism Design
Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation Insights
The author explores the design of a Bayesian game setting for transaction fee mechanisms in blockchain systems, aiming to achieve both user truthfulness and miner revenue.
消費者余剰最大化のための最適メカニズム
消費者余剰を最大化するための最適メカニズムに焦点を当てる。
Truthful Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets with Budget Constraints
This research paper proposes and analyzes truthful mechanisms for resource exchange markets where agents have budget constraints, aiming to maximize market liquid welfare while minimizing the need for subsidies.
Optimal Resource Allocation Using Peer Information in the Absence of Monetary Transfers
This paper explores the challenge of optimal resource allocation without relying on monetary transfers, focusing on how peer information can be leveraged to design effective allocation mechanisms.
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