Dynamical Stability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Games
Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in asymmetric games, where players have different roles, can be defined in various ways. The dynamical stability of these ESS definitions under the replicator equation is analyzed, and connections between game theory, dynamical systems, and information theory are established.
Strategic Data Gathering with Boundedly Rational Agents
The optimal "de-biasing" procedure for a survey designer to estimate the true public reception of a product, given strategic and boundedly-rational respondents with varying levels of information and cognitive hierarchy.
Adaptation Procedure for Iterative Interactions in Misinformation Games
The Adaptation Procedure models iterative interactions in misinformation games, where players update their subjective views of the game based on the actual payoffs received, leading to a refinement of the natural misinformed equilibrium called the stable misinformed equilibrium.
Privacy Can Arise Endogenously in an Economic System with Learning Agents
Privacy can arise naturally as an equilibrium strategy in price discrimination games between buyers and a seller, even without explicit privacy mechanisms.
Rigging Elo Ratings: Achieving the Highest Possible Rating Through Game Manipulation
It is possible to achieve an extremely high Elo rating by rigging a large number of games, with the maximum rating depending on the number of players and games.
General Lotto Games with Scouts: Analyzing the Impact of Asymmetric Information on Resource Allocation
The core message of this paper is to study the effect of information asymmetry on resource allocation in General Lotto games, where one player (Blue) can gain information about the other player's (Red) resource allocation with a certain probability.
Designing Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Social Welfare and Temporal Logic Constraints
Incentives and rewards can be designed to achieve desirable equilibria in concurrent games with temporal logic constraints.
RL-CFR: Dynamic Action Abstraction in IIEFGs with Reinforcement Learning
RL-CFR introduces a novel approach for dynamic action abstraction in Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) using reinforcement learning.
Policy Space Response Oracles: A Comprehensive Survey
PSRO is a game-theoretic framework that combines equilibrium computation with learning, providing a versatile approach for large-scale games.
Efficient Algorithm for Follower-Agnostic Learning in Stackelberg Games
Efficient algorithm for follower-agnostic learning in Stackelberg games.
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