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insight - Auction Theory
Auction Formats that Prevent Seller Manipulation Through Shill Bidding
This paper characterizes auction formats that are "shill-proof" in the sense that a profit-maximizing seller has no incentive to submit any shill bids.
Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance
Winner-pays-bid auctions minimize revenue variance and risk in auction settings.
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions: NP-Hardness and PTAS
The authors explore the complexity of designing optimal auctions with information disclosure, proving NP-hardness and proposing a PTAS for computing optimal joint designs.
Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Revenue Variance Analysis
Winner-pays-bid auctions minimize revenue variance by optimizing payment rules in auction theory.
Analyzing Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers in Auctions
The author settles the competition complexity of n bidders with additive values over m independent items at Θ(√nm) by designing a Bayesian IC auction, improving prior lower bounds.
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