Characterizing the Top Trading Cycles Rule in Housing Markets with Lexicographic Preferences and Limited Externalities
In housing markets where agents have lexicographic preferences, prioritizing either the house they receive or the recipient of their endowment, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) rule is the only mechanism that guarantees individual rationality, pair efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
유한 표본에서의 할당량 메커니즘: 최적성 및 강건성 분석
유한한 의사결정 상황에서 할당량 메커니즘은 정보 비대칭 문제를 해결하는 데 효과적이며, 특히 의사결정 오류에 대한 명확한 한계를 제시하고, 다른 메커니즘에 비해 강건성을 지니고 있음을 보여줍니다.
ロバストなロバスト性：曖昧性集合外の事前分布に対するペイオフ保証の安定性
メカニズムデザインにおいて、従来のマキシミンアプローチは、曖昧性集合内の最悪ケースの期待ペイオフを保証するメカニズムを最適としていましたが、本稿では、曖昧性集合外の近傍にある事前分布に対してもペイオフ保証が大きく変動しない「ロバストなロバスト性」の概念を提唱しています。
Obvious Doctor Manipulations in Matching Markets with and without Contracts
While stable-dominating mechanisms are not obviously manipulable in matching markets without contracts, the introduction of contracts makes mechanisms like HDAM and EADAM vulnerable to very obvious manipulations by doctors.
Stackelberg vs. Nash Equilibria in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game: Analyzing the Impact of Sequential Decision-Making
In resource allocation competitions modeled as Lottery Colonel Blotto games, a Stackelberg model, where one player acts as a leader and commits to a strategy before the follower responds, offers a strategic advantage compared to simultaneous decision-making in a Nash equilibrium.
私有博弈：觀點競爭與極化代理人
本文提出了一種新的博弈論模型「私有博弈」，用於分析去中心化環境下，具有不同觀點的代理人如何在多個項目上進行競爭，並探討不同結果函數對穩定策略存在的影響。
편향된 사용자 간의 관점 경쟁: 비공개 블로토 게임
본 논문에서는 사용자들이 자신의 편향에 따라 전략적으로 행동할 수 있는 상황에서 소셜 미디어 플랫폼과 같은 시스템에서 사용자 참여를 효율적으로 활용하는 방법을 게임 이론적 관점에서 분석합니다.
Dynamical Stability of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Games
Evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in asymmetric games, where players have different roles, can be defined in various ways. The dynamical stability of these ESS definitions under the replicator equation is analyzed, and connections between game theory, dynamical systems, and information theory are established.
Strategic Data Gathering with Boundedly Rational Agents
The optimal "de-biasing" procedure for a survey designer to estimate the true public reception of a product, given strategic and boundedly-rational respondents with varying levels of information and cognitive hierarchy.
Adaptation Procedure for Iterative Interactions in Misinformation Games
The Adaptation Procedure models iterative interactions in misinformation games, where players update their subjective views of the game based on the actual payoffs received, leading to a refinement of the natural misinformed equilibrium called the stable misinformed equilibrium.
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